![]() ![]() Those functions include – but are not limited to – early warning of missile launches, communications, geopositioning, navigation, and timing and synchronization of NC3 systems and networks. Except for North Korea, all nuclear-armed states rely on satellites to varying degrees for NC3 functions. Primarily, the assets in question are various types of satellites orbiting Earth, some of which are dual use, implying their use by both nuclear and nonnuclear forces and military and civilian operators. Instead, its focus will be on NC3’s space-based elements and the likely consequences for strategic stability of hampering or destroying those space-based NC3 assets. This comparatively concise study has no intention of revisiting the decades-old debate surrounding NC3. Meanwhile, some analysts sounded the alarm on the dangers of what they described as “nuclear Sarajevos”: “construction of fantastically complex nuclear command organizations parallels the conflict institutions built in the decade before 1914, but on a far more spectacular and quick-reacting scale” (Bracken Citation1983, 3). It was pointed out that “weapons and strategic doctrines are meaningless unless the superpowers also have the means to know what is happening in the chaos of a crisis or war and have orders carried out precisely and faithfully” (Carter Citation1985, 32). The significance of NC3 for nuclear stability and deterrence caught the attention of military planners and scholars alike, especially toward the later phases of the Cold War. Most of those elements are terrestrial others are positioned in space. NC3 comprises the comprehensive network of sensors, communication channels, command-and-control hardware and software, and crews operating them through which nuclear-armed states detect, transmit, and distribute warnings of an impending nuclear strike, make decisions on appropriate response, and issue orders to their own nuclear forces. This dangerous and destabilizing property of space-to-space operations holds the potential of complicating nuclear-armed states’ endeavor to preserve the coherence of their NC3 – a situation whose negative ramifications on strategic stability could be serious and potentially catastrophic.Īlthough the focus of most analysts and the fascination of the public have largely been on nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles, such as ballistic missiles and bombers, equally if not more important is the role played by the nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) architecture and capabilities fielded by states possessing nuclear weapons. Augmenting the potential and attractiveness of space-to-space engagements in anti-satellite role though are the limitations of space situational awareness and the consequent difficulties encountered in prompt and unfailing detection and attribution of space-to-space intrusions. ![]() On the downside, the real-life efficiency of space-to-space engagements is subject to important limitations and unknowns. Recent technological advances in so-called proximity operations have rendered such space-to-space engagements more achievable, effective, and attractive. Among the range of options to achieve such destruction or interference are kinetic and non-kinetic attacks executed by other satellites and craft that are themselves positioned in space. Ever since the placing in orbit of the first satellites, state and non-state actors have persistently pursued ways to harm them or to interrupt or compromise their services. Yet high confidence placed in those satellites’ uninterrupted availability is based on shaky grounds and potentially dangerous. Satellites in Earth’s orbit fulfill important functions in support of NC3 – nuclear command, control, and communication infrastructures of nuclear-armed states. ![]()
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